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THE EDUCATIONAL LIMITS OF ETHICAL COSMOPOLITANISM:  
TOWARD THE IMPORTANCE OF VIRTUE IN COSMOPOLITAN EDUCATION 




Cosmopolitanism has become an influential theory in both political and, increasingly, 
educational discourse. In simple terms cosmopolitanism can be understood as a response to 
the globalised and diverse world in which we live. Diverse in nature, cosmopolitan ideas 
come in many forms. The focus here is on what have been termed “strong” ethical forms of 
cosmopolitanism; that is, positions which conceptualise moral bonds and obligations as 
resulting from a shared, common humanity. The view that pupils should be taught that all 
human beings are equal and, crucially, that this entails a responsibility to take action when 
human equity is challenged or transgressed, is finding increasing expression within 
educational literature. The suggestion explored here is that strong forms of ethical 
cosmopolitanism are limited ways which seriously limits their educational worth. In the final 
section, it is argued that forms of cultural and political cosmopolitanism (which are part of 
the lived experiences of intra- and supra-national citizenship) are best responded to by 
developing the requisite virtues in pupils to engage with diverse and dialogic communities. 
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In recent years a significant body of literature in the fields of political science (for example, 
Appiah, 2006; Held, 2005; 2010; Nussbaum, 1994, 1996) and a growing corpus in the field of 
education (for example, Merry and de Ruyter, 2011; Osler and Starkey, 2003) has identified 
“cosmopolitanism” as a meaningful and useful concept for understanding contemporary 
citizenship. A core tenet of cosmopolitan theories is an acceptance of the “fact” of 
globalisation and a desire to understand and define citizenship identities as transcending 
rootedness in the nation-state. According to one of cosmopolitanism’s leading proponents, 
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the boundaries between traditional nation-states have broken down to the extent that states, 
and their citizens, are inherently interconnected in ‘overlapping communities of fate’ (Held, 
2005: 1). As such there is an increasing need for, and a persuasiveness of, a cosmopolitan 
world outlook. Cosmopolitanism itself is a diffuse concept, which permits a range of 
interpretations based on particular political, cultural and – of specific interest here – ethical 
claims. “Ethical cosmopolitanism” can be understood in terms of theories which include ‘the 
acknowledgement of some notion of common humanity that translates ethically into an idea 
of shared or common moral duties toward others by virtue of this humanity’ (Lu, 2000: 245; 
emphasis added). Such a position is exemplified in Held’s (2010: 69) assertion that 
‘[H]umankind belongs to a single ‘moral realm’ in which each person is regarded as equally 
worthy of respect and consideration’. That this cosmopolitanism principle provides a 
meaningful ethic which can guide and shape educational practice has received increasing 
levels of attention in educational discourse.  
 
The aim here is to critique the work of those theorists whom seek to assert what have been 
termed “strong” forms of ethical cosmopolitanism as appropriate to the moral aims and goals 
of education. First, the nature of the “strong” cosmopolitan ethic and its relationship to 
education will be considered. Following this, a number of criticisms will be advanced which, 
it is argued, render this cosmopolitan ethic educationally problematic. In the third and final 
section, it will be suggested that education does need to respond to, and support pupils for, 
their cultural and political cosmopolitan experiences, but that an apt normative ethical theory 
of the moral obligations of citizenship is better provided by a virtue-based perspective than 
by deontological, duty-based forms of ethical cosmopolitanism. This virtue-based approach 
conceives the moral obligations between citizens as inherently connected to intra- and supra-
national political communities. In the contemporary world, a particular feature of such 
communities – which are complex and challenging – is undeniably their culturally 
cosmopolitan nature. Some implications for cosmopolitan education are then considered.   
 
 Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Education 
 
As indicated in the introduction, cosmopolitanism is a diverse field and as such it is important 
that the concept is not viewed in homogenous terms. In its simplest formulation, 
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cosmopolitan derives from the empirical assertion that the processes of globalisation have 
resulted in social and political networks which render the traditional locus of citizenship 
affiliations and membership less relevant (though not necessarily obsolete). Cosmopolitanism 
has been offered (in some formulations simultaneously) as a political, cultural, economic, and 
ethical theory. In order to clarify the focus here on specifically ethical versions of 
cosmopolitanism, it is useful to draw on the distinction between “weak” and “strong” forms 
of the cosmopolitan ethical (Miller, 2002a). In its “weak” formulation, cosmopolitanism is 
founded on the ethical claim that all human beings are of equal worth (and dignity). This 
claim is limited in the sense that it does not seek to identify any resulting moral 
responsibilities for action upon the individual. Morally speaking, that is, it does not in and of 
itself require citizens to help others who have their equal humanity challenged or transgressed 
wherever in the world they may be. In contrast, for “strong” cosmopolitans, the recognition 
of common human dignity carries with it important further normative obligations between 
individuals qua human beings. At the heart of strong forms of ethical cosmopolitanism is the 
moral claim that our allegiances and obligations transcend parochialism and are not bounded 
by proximity. In concrete terms, this places particular burdens of responsibility on citizens 
towards others living outside the immediate nation-state. That is, in situations where the 
equality and dignity of humans is oppressed, individuals, often living distant lives in faraway 
nations, have a moral duty to act in support of those suffering such oppression by virtue of 
their common humanity (albeit within some certain levels of constraint). According to Held 
(2010: 70-71) citizens: 
 
 ... have to be aware of, and accountable for, the consequences of actions, 
 direct or indirect, intended or unintended, which may radically restrict or 
 delimit the choices of others. Individuals have both personal-responsibility- 
 rights as well as personal-responsibility-obligations. 
 
Such responsibilities are not constrained by local or national boundaries. From this strong 
position, those boundaries which seek to limit our moral obligations to those within a given 
confine (such as the political community of a given nation-state) are seen to be arbitrary in 
moral terms (Nussbaum, 1994, 1996; see also Appiah, 2006). It is for this reason that the 
strong cosmopolitan position is frequently contrasted with communitarian positions which 
limit or prioritise the existence of stronger moral obligations to those within the same national 
communities. In asserting this ethical claim, strong cosmopolitans are invoking a particular 
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moral idea which draws on the Cynic Diogenes’ assertion, when asked from where he came, 
that ‘I am a citizen of the world [kosmopolitês]’. More significantly, strong ethical 
cosmopolitanism also draws on the moral universalism of Immanuel Kant’s principle of 
citizens as “ends in themselves”. From this Kantian, deontological perspective, action is 
morally right when it is in accordance with duty. As such, the sort of strong ethical 
cosmopolitanism with which I am interested in here advances a form of moral universalism 
based on a particular formulation of a deontological rule – namely, that moral duties follow 
from the recognition of a common human worth that is common to all humans irrespective of 
their geographical and physical location. It is this specific and significant cosmopolitan 
dimension which has gained increasing attention within educational discourse and which is of 
particular interest here. According to one of the leading proponents of strong ethical 
cosmopolitanism, Martha Nussbaum (1996: 7), we are morally compelled to ensure that 
through our actions we do nothing that ‘we know to be immoral from the perspective of 
Kant's community of all humanity’. This requires citizens living in one particular nation-state 
community to consider and account for the needs of others in the world. For Nussbaum, there 
is a need to “work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern” 
(Ibid, 9). Moreover, and with regard to education, Nussbaum contends that ‘world 
citizenship, rather than democratic or national citizenship, [should be] the focus for civic 
education’ (ibid, 11).  
 
The strong ethical cosmopolitanism found within contemporary political science has found 
recent expression in educational discourse. At times, this is implicit. According to two of the 
leading educational proponents of the cosmopolitan ethic, a defining characteristic of the 
educated cosmopolitan citizen is to ‘work to achieve peace, human rights and democracy 
within the local community and at a global level, by... accepting personal responsibility and 
recognising the importance of civic commitment’ (Osler and Starkey, 2003: 246; emphasis 
added). In exploring the relationship between cosmopolitanism and civic education, the 
political scientist Jeremy Waldron (2003: 23) suggests that:  
 
 The moral concern we should be teaching our children is equal concern for 
 all humans in the world; and the identity we should encourage young people 
 to recognize is an identity that involves “recognizing humanity in the stranger 




Further support for the educational worth of the strong cosmopolitan ethic has recently come 
from Michael Merry and Doret de Ruyter. Drawing heavily on cosmopolitan normativity they 
have suggested that ‘moral educators must teach that cosmopolitan morality obliges one to do 
what one is able to do’ (Merry and de Ruyter, 2011: 4). A key part of the educational utility 
of the cosmopolitan ethic is its focus on the question as to why we might choose (or be 
obliged) to act to help challenge and address injustices suffered by others beyond the borders 
of our own nation-state as sequentially prior to questions regarding how such help might 
materialise. In conceptualising the importance of the cosmopolitan ethic to educational 
discourse and practice, both Osler and Starkey, and Merry and de Ruyter, present global 
citizen responsibility as a universal (in the sense of applying to all) principle founded on 
notions of shared humanity, global solidarity, and human rights.  
 
For some then, the strong cosmopolitan ethic provides an important potential educational 
response to the difficulties of preparing pupils for the experiences and challenges of living in 
an increasingly globalised, plural and complex world. There are, however, a number of 
reasons to question the efficacy of strong cosmopolitanism as a normative theory of moral 
obligations and, therefore, as a framework for informing education. It is to these tensions that 
focus now turns. 
 
 Cosmopolitan Education: Some Criticisms 
 
There are a number of reasons to doubt the persuasiveness of strong ethical forms of 
cosmopolitanism with specific regard to education. As the British political philosopher and 
critic of cosmopolitanism David Miller (2002a: 81) reminds us, the core cosmopolitan claim 
of the equal moral worth of human beings is simply ‘platitudinous’ for the reason that very 
few would disagree with the principles of human equity and dignity. When strong 
cosmopolitans employ this core claim as a base from which to talk of moral obligation (and 
therefore an expectation for action) across humanity, cosmopolitanism becomes problematic 




A central criticism of cosmopolitanism as a political and ethical theory is the realist 
contention that its ideals are simply that – utopian principles which bear little relation to 
actual lives and experiences of individuals in the contemporary world. Put simply, it expects 
too much and does so in not unambiguous terms. A strong cosmopolitan ethic tells us little of 
value regarding the inter-connection between (i) these utopian ideals, (ii) the strength of the 
moral compulsion acting upon individuals and (iii) the practical actions which an individual 
may take in order to fulfil the moral obligations which cosmopolitanism apparently requires 
of them. Lu (2000: 250) expresses this point clearly in her commentary on critics of 
cosmopolitanism: ‘ironically, perhaps precisely because of its worldly aspirations, it 
[cosmopolitanism] has virtually no real world application’. Even its proponents are aware of 
the utopianism which lies at the heart of the cosmopolitan ethic: ‘[M]oral education informed 
by cosmopolitanism is not for the faint heart. Its demands will seem unrelenting. To help 
prevent moral educators and their pupils from feeling overwhelmed, they will need to 
acknowledge that moral cosmopolitanism is an ideal’ (Merry and de Ruyter, 2011: 3). In 
recognising this idealism, Merry and de Ruyter make use of the strong cosmopolitan ethic to 
identify an important role for education in helping pupils to understand their moral 
obligations as cosmopolitan citizens. Thus, whilst ‘...in the absence of important background 
conditions ‘justice for all’ demands too much of us, but this does not absolve us from certain 
moral obligations’ (Merry and de Ruyter, 2011: 2). What is not clear is precisely what such 
‘certain moral obligations’ might be when applied to either political or educational practice. 
For its supporters, strong ethical cosmopolitanism may well have real world application, but 
as they present the theory it lacks any real substantive detail capable of usefully guide, inform 
and shape the actions of citizens, a point returned to in more detail later in this section.  
 
It is also possible to conceive that to teach pupils that they are morally obliged to uphold and 
further justice in a this strong ethical cosmopolitan sense neglects and undermines the moral 
significance of democratic forms of citizen engagement within nation-states. As the 
influential American political scientist Amy Gutmann makes clear (1994): 
 
Our obligations as democratic citizens go beyond our duties as politically- 
unorganized individuals because our capacity to act effectively to further 
justice increases when we are empowered as citizens, and so therefore 
does our responsibility to act to further justice. Democratic citizens have 
institutional means at their disposal that solitary individuals, or "citizens of 
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the world" only, do not. Some of those institutional means are international 
in scope, but even those (the United Nations being the most prominent  
example) tend to depend on the cooperation of sovereign societies for 
effective action. 
 
It is simply an empirical fact that the vast majority of the processes, systems and mechanisms 
for furthering justice democratically that are available to citizens are fundamentally rooted 
within sovereign democratic nation-states. It is through engagement in democratic 
communities (which may of course involve matters of global concern) that citizens’ gain 
motivation to further participate and act, although this may include working toward the 
realization of universal political ideals (cf. Laborde, 2002). 
 
An additional concern with attempts to invoke a strong cosmopolitan ethic in educational 
contexts is its reliance on an overly abstract and impartial rationalism. Writing in the 1930s, 
the German critic Max Boehm refers to cosmopolitanism as ‘a mental attitude prompting the 
individual to substitute for his attachments to his more immediate homeland an analogous 
relationship toward the whole world, which he comes to regard as a greater and higher 
fatherland’ (1932: 458). In its strongest form ethical cosmopolitanism appears to require 
individuals, in a moral sense, to detach themselves from their particularistic and parochial 
loyalties and sentiments. Expressed in simple terms, this requires citizens to make a rational 
choice to over-ride or ignore basic affective attachments. In this sense the strong 
cosmopolitan requirement is coercive. To ask citizens to downplay or ignore the primacy of 
communal bonds and obligations also begs the following question: if all human beings are 
equal why should I seek to protect a particular person (which may be my child, sibling, friend 
or fellow citizen) from harm and injustice in favour of any other person (which may be a 
stranger living a great distance away)? For those who doubt the persuasiveness of the 
cosmopolitan ethic, this excessive rationalism is not only detrimental to more local (including 
national) communal bonds but is also psychologically difficult (if not impossible) to achieve. 
Paraphrasing Nussbaum, Barber (1994) suggests that: 
 
No one actually lives "in the world of which the cosmopolitan wishes us 
to be good citizens”. Rather, we live in this particular neighborhood of the 
world, that block, this valley, that seashore, this family. Our attachments 
start parochially and only then grow outwards. To bypass them in favour 
of an immediate cosmopolitanism is to risk ending up nowhere – feeling 
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neither at home nor in the world.  
 
If we take the cosmopolitan ethic seriously as an educational framework, there is a distinct 
danger that it might result in the abstraction of pupils from their particularistic histories and 
emotional ties which give meaning to bonds with family, friends and fellow (in the sense of 
local and national) citizens. As Marx (1994) reflects ‘to disregard the role in human 
experience of the contingent and the irrational, unfortunate as that role may be, is to risk 
adopting merely visionary, hence infeasible, programs of action’. It would appear, then, that 
one reason why strong cosmopolitanism falls down as a basis for educational practice is 
precisely because the sense of trust, solidarity, and mutuality through which humans, at least 
in part, are constituted is simply not available on a supra-national or global level.  
 
It is important, educationally speaking, to remember that the local and national attachments at 
the heart of as concerned with the affective as they are with the cognitive. Bryan Turner 
(2002: 49) talks of the importance of ‘emotional specificity’ when he argues that the 
‘geography of emotions... appears to be important in creating civic loyalties and 
commitments. Memories need a location where... common rituals can be enacted’. For Turner 
(2002: 49) it ‘would therefore be difficult to grasp how individuals might feel some 
passionate loyalties to global government or indeed to any global identities’. This does not 
necessarily mean that such emotional attachment is impossible at the global / world level, but 
rather (i) that the bonds of emotional specificity become stretched as we move outwards from 
the familial to the global and (ii) that connections at a global level are in important ways 
dependent on, and build from, the relationships and bonds which citizens enjoy with their 
more immediate fellows. For this reason it may well be useful to consider cosmopolitan 
attachments as the outer sphere of a set of concentric circles emanating out from the 
individual (and including the family, the local community, and the national political 
community). Crucially, however, it is difficult to conceive that the bonds, and therefore 
obligations, do not become more complex, diffuse, and therefore weaker, as we move 
outwards from our immediate familial relationships. The result is a serious undermining of 
the educational legitimacy of inculcating in pupils the belief that the ‘scope of moral 




That there are tensions in this standpoint is accepted by a number of cosmopolitans, who 
typically offer two main responses. The first response is to concede that individuals owe 
greater moral obligation to those with whom they share the closest bonds (family, friends, 
local/national communities), whilst reinforcing the cosmopolitan ethic alongside (but not 
necessarily equal to) these commitments. Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006), for example, 
accepts that ‘[W]hatever my basic obligations are to the poor far away, they cannot be 
enough, I believe, to trump, my concerns for my family, my friends, my country; nor can the 
argument that every life matters require me to be indifferent to the fact that one of those lives 
is mine’. Nevertheless, we are told that citizens – as individuals and through membership of a 
particular nation-state – have an obligation to ‘do our fair share’ to help protect the basic 
needs of others in the world. Appiah’s position resonates in the educational cosmopolitanism 
of Merry and de Ruyter (2011: 2; emphasis added), who have suggested that ‘[A]t a 
minimum the struggle against injustice entails that one reduce the suffering of others, as far 
as one is able, irrespective of pre-existing desires or relationships, but also geographical 
proximity, of those in need of help’. In these cosmopolitan positions the use of terminology is 
inherently problematic. Neither ‘do our fair share’ nor ‘as far as one is able’ are particularly 
helpful in guiding educators and pupils regarding the extent of responsibility, the level of 
moral compulsion operating upon them, or the sorts of actions which one might be expected 
to take.  
 
To illustrate, consider the following scenario. A man living in the south of England, and 
whom has been unemployed for an extended period, is struggling to provide his family with 
food and shelter. The man wins £100 though a lottery competition. Now, given that most 
strong cosmopolitans are happy to concede that we owe an especial responsibility to our 
family, we would probably agree that the man does not do anything morally wrong when he 
uses the money to buy food for his family. Now let us imagine that the man winning the £100 
is already extremely wealthy – a multimillionaire in fact. In such a situation it would still be 
quite difficult to present a compelling argument that the wealthy man is morally wrong (as 
opposed to being dislikeable or selfish) for deciding to use the money to treat his family, 
rather than donating it to an aid organisation to relieve the suffering of others in another 
country (see Unger, 1996 for an example of such an argument). The moral situation becomes 
even more complex if we reconstitute the man as neither poor nor rich, but merely financially 
comfortable. In the first and third of these situations the cosmopolitan ethic is of little use in 
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terms of guiding action or assessing the moral actions of those involved. Even in the third 
situation, that of the millionaire, it would still be extremely difficult (i) to justify his 
responsibility to allocate his additional resource (the £100) to help strangers overseas rather 
than his family or (i) to quantify whether, if he had chosen to donate the money to an aid 
organisation, this would equate to “doing his fair share” (we might, for example, suggest that 
he should have donated more than the £100). Despite the attempt by some supporters to allow 
for greater bonds of loyalty to those closest to us, strong ethical cosmopolitanism remains too 
vague to offer any substantive guide to citizen action and, for this reason, educational 
practice. 
 
The second response to the tension within strong cosmopolitanism around equal loyalties to 
all citizens in the world, which is found commonly in educational discourse, is to depict the 
lived experience of cosmopolitanism as predominantly localised in nature. This stance is 
taken by Audrey Osler (2008: 22) when, for example, she argues that:  
 
[E]ducation for cosmopolitan citizenship... requires us to re-imagine the nation.. 
as cosmopolitan and to recognise local communities and the national 
community as cosmopolitan. It implies a sense of solidarity with strangers 
in distant places but it also requires solidarity, a sense of shared humanity 
and dialogue with those in the local community and the national community 
whose perspectives may be very different from our own.  
 
It is difficult to refute that cosmopolitanism (in the sense of the increasingly heterogeneous 
nature of cultures within Western political communities) is not part of most (if not all) 
citizen’s lived experience today. Indeed, preparation for this is something which I suggest 
later should form part of pupils’ education. So too is it hard to counter any suggestion that 
there are significant political, social and moral reasons that cultural diversity within political 
communities be both recognised and open to deliberative democratic practices. The central 
point being expressed here is a suggestion that citizens meet their cosmopolitan obligations 
(at least in part) through the actions and discourse which they engage in within localised 
contexts; that is, within their cosmopolitan communities. In and of itself such a stance is not, 
educationally speaking, problematic. It becomes so, however, when it is aligned with the 
strong cosmopolitan ethic. Such a stance is at least implicit when Osler and Starkey, for 
whom the interconnection between the global and the local is fundamental, contend that 
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whilst cosmopolitan citizenship ‘implies recognition of our common humanity and a sense of 
solidarity with others’, this is contingent on establishing the same bond with ‘others in our 
own communities, especially those whom we perceive to be different from ourselves’ (2003: 
252; emphasis added). Moreover, such an alignment raises a pertinent issue for educators in 
relation to the source of the moral responsibility which citizens have both to fellow citizens 
and the state. That is, whether moral responsibility to others within our localised communities 
derives from a shared humanity or from communal bonds based a common history, common 
concerns and shared values within that local community. Whilst the former transcends the 
nation-state, the latter is often fundamentally rooted within it and derives its source from 
elsewhere than the notion of common human equality.  
 
To summarise, and according to David Miller (2002a: 81), ‘[T]here is a gap between our 
moral assessments of states of affairs and the reasons we have for acting in relation to those 
states of affairs’. The gap to which Miller draws our attention is important and is of particular 
educational significance. As stated previously, few would dispute the basic principle of 
human equity nor the need to take seriously certain forms of cosmopolitanism as a feature of 
our lives today. However, because strong forms of ethical cosmopolitanism seek to invoke 
normative moral obligations which do not have sufficient justification, and because they 
leave ambiguous any specific action-guiding principles, they ultimately fail as a significant 
basis for educational curricula and practice. For these reasons, to utilise the strong 
cosmopolitan ethic as a basis for education is at best unwarranted and at worst coercive.  
   
 The importance of virtue in cosmopolitan education and communities  
 
I have argued in the previous section that there are serious reasons to doubt the educational 
efficacy of ethical formulations of cosmopolitanism that seek to impose on individual citizens 
a compelling personal responsibility derived from universal principles of human equity and 
rights. I have also suggested, nevertheless, that very few educationalists would reject the 
principle of cosmopolitanism in its entirety. The processes of globalisation, coupled with 
greater ease of economic and political citizen mobility between nation-states, has 
undoubtedly led to an increase in lived cosmopolitan experiences – if we understand by that 
the principle that most citizens living in a Western nation-state encounter a range of political 
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and cultural influences, representations, ideas and systems in their day to day lives both 
within and beyond their own nation-states (see Waldron, 2000 for example). To this extent, 
cultural cosmopolitanism is an empirical fact of life for most citizens in Western societies 
which adds to and influences, rather than replaces, deeper attachments to local and national 
communities.  
 
Taking this recognition as a starting point, in what remains of this article, I would like to 
explore briefly what form a more useful moral response to the cultural cosmopolitanism 
condition of contemporary citizenship in Western political communities might take. 
Crucially, I would like to suggest that it is not the case that forms of cosmopolitanism which 
seek to advance a robust ethical standpoint need necessarily adopt a form of moral 
universalism founded on a deontological, duty-based approach. When faced with both the 
richness and challenges which cultural cosmopolitanism brings within and beyond the nation-
state we should, educationally speaking, look not to deontological forms of strong ethical 
cosmopolitanism but instead to a virtue-based theory of moral relationships in order to 
explain the sorts of moral obligations which we have to others. In other words, a virtue ethics 
perspective might provide a more useful educational framework for considering obligations 
which citizens have within their cosmopolitan political communities. In this section, 
therefore, I seek to make a case for a virtue-based approach to cosmopolitan ethics. Because 
the virtue-based approach is one which (in contrast to the deontological standpoint of the 
strong cosmopolitan theories considered here) both encourages and guides action some initial 
requirements for effective engagement within cosmopolitan political communities are 
suggested and considered. Lastly, and whilst it is recognised that the task is one which is 
inherently complex, some thoughts are provided regarding the educational task of teaching 
and learning about and for the importance of virtues in cosmopolitan political communities. 
 
A virtue ethics approach challenges the strong cosmopolitan understanding of supra-national 
obligations which, owing to its Kantian roots, basis its normative claim on the universal 
scope of a rule-based ethic – namely that humans act in a morally right way when they take 
seriously the cosmopolitan claim that, because all humans are of equal worth, we are morally 
obliged to help others when human dignity is oppressed, irrespective of national communities 
and borders. Virtue ethicists are less interested in such rule-based principles, and focus 
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instead on the relationship between moral action and character. It is in the characteristics of 
conduct, rather than actions in accordance with a governing moral principle, that the content 
of one’s moral character is both formed and expressed. Approaching the moral relationships 
involved in recognising cultural and political cosmopolitanism in terms of virtues and human 
character provides a deeper and more rounded understanding of the sorts of actions and 
conduct which cosmopolitanism entails – something which, as argued previously, is 
problematic from the dominant duty-based ethical cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, and as is 
considered in more detail below, a virtue perspective has the possibility to illuminate the sorts 
of character that pupils (and citizens) might need to engage effectively within the 
cosmopolitan communities (both within and beyond the nation-state). 
 
Initially, this claim may appear surprising. However, in recent years, there has been a 
burgeoning of interest in the possible connections between cosmopolitanism and virtues in 
political science. In his consideration of cosmopolitanism and virtues Bryan Turner (2002: 
47) has explored the obligations deriving from, and relating to, human rights. For Turner, 
these ‘human rights obligations’ may usefully be framed in terms of ‘cosmopolitan virtue’. 
Central to Turner’s thesis is his reconstitution of cosmopolitanism as the expression of certain 
virtues understood as inherently related to human obligations. Such virtues include ‘care for 
cultures, ironic distance from one’s own traditions, concern for the integrity of cultures in a 
hybrid world, [and] openness to cross-cultural criticism’ (Turner, 2002: 60). What Turner has 
in mind here are particular attitudes of mind which allow citizens to discuss and deliberate 
the cultural bonds which they derive from communal and national citizenship in 
cosmopolitan environments. Another notable attempt to present cosmopolitanism in terms of 
virtues has been provided by Stan Van Hooft. Van Hooft (2007: 308) considers the following 
statement as indicative of arguments which recognise the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of 
culture and political participation: 
 
 The kind of moral agenda... which I believe to be what many... global 
 citizens would endorse is one in which the core human values of security, 
 justice and democracy are to be achieved not merely through the agency of 
 governments within a society of states but also through global responsibility 
 exercised by individuals to support these goals and through the acceptance 




Pertinently, and missing from the work of proponents of strong ethical cosmopolitanism, Van 
Hooft asks ‘what virtues are involved in cosmopolitanism conceived of in this way’. Across 
his analysis, Van Hooft presents a number of “cosmopolitan virtues” which he accords with 
being a global citizen: “tolerance”, “interest in/empathy for ways of life”, “fallibalism”, 
“generosity”, “taking responsibility”, “hope”, “courage”, “justice”, and “compassion”. 
According to this analysis, these general virtues have particular cosmopolitan interpretations. 
For example, justice as a cosmopolitan virtue is conceived by Van Hooft as the ‘willingness 
and ability to see the other as as fully human as oneself and as a genuine limit upon one’s 
own will’ (2007: 313). A key strength of these perceptions is their focus on the sorts of 
dispositions and attributes central to meaningful recognition of, and action within, 
cosmopolitan communities. Moreover, whilst linked to principles of humanity, they ask us to 
focus on moral excellence and human development rather than on simply acting in 
accordance with a conjectural rule. 
 
In suggesting that a virtue-based response to cosmopolitanism is of value to educational 
practice, I am less convinced than both Turner and Van Hooft that it makes sense to talk of 
specifically “cosmopolitan” virtues. Indeed, the demarcation of specific types of virtues is as 
part of a wider trend within contemporary political science which has resulted in both the 
proliferation of virtues and the subsequent division of these into certain adjectival categories 
(see, for example, the work of William Galston, 1995). If virtue is defined in the sense of 
moral excellence and as referencing a quality of character which is good in and of itself we 
can see that certain virtues, such as courage and loyalty, are virtues per se. Properly 
constituted and understood, the “cosmopolitan” virtues found within the work of Turner and 
Van Hooft are, in fact, derivations of core virtues, albeit enacted in the context of lived 
cosmopolitan experiences. Nevertheless, what both Turner and Van Hooft remind us is that 
there is value in conceiving the moral relationships between citizens living in different 
nation-states in terms of the possession of certain attributes, capacities and dispositions – 
virtues – rather than in an abstract, rule-based formulation. To adopt such a position is to 
conceive of a fundamental relationship between the moral and the political; that is, that any 
moral obligations which derive from cosmopolitanism are constituted by obligations to and 
within political communities. This owes to the fact that political and cultural 
cosmopolitanism offers ‘important possibilities of self-rule and political influence ‘which lie’ 
outside the borders of the nation-state’ (Bohman, 2001: 4). For this reason, and as I have 
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argued elsewhere, citizens have a normative obligation to engage in cosmopolitan political 
communities which are intra- and supra-national (Peterson, 2011). Crucially, the moral 
obligation to do so results not from the principle of human equality, but from human 
excellence; from the need to develop and express virtue that is.  
 
A central feature of the moral obligations which result from supra-national forms of 
citizenship is that they are not necessarily uniform in nature and scope. As David Miller 
(2002a: 84) argues ‘what we have now is a patchwork of connections, some economic, some 
cultural, some political, each giving rise to different kinds of ethical responsibility’. Once this 
is accepted, the apt educational question concerns the sort of moral development pupils 
require in order to participate effectively within such a patchwork. The contention offered 
here is that those citizens who are likely to be most effective in their cosmopolitan 
experiences are those whom possess (or come to possess) the virtues which enable them to 
participate in intra- and supra-national political processes and communities. If this claim is 
accepted, any form of moral and political education aiming to include a cosmopolitan 
dimension need take account of this focus on character and virtue. 
 
As suggested earlier, the sort of moral response to cosmopolitanism that I am seeking to 
defend is tentative, and immediately raises certain tensions. As such, there are certain 
qualifications which are important to recognise. First, and as has been signified above, the 
view that citizens have moral obligations to supra-national political communities by virtue of 
their membership and participation within such communities is no argument that the local 
and national communities found within nation-states are diminished. Owing to bonds of 
closer cultural and political intimacy and immediacy, there is a good deal of reason to 
recognise (in both education and within other social institutions) that stronger bonds of moral 
obligation exist between citizens within local and national political communities than exist 
beyond the nation-state. 
 
Second, and related to the first, as they are currently constituted and experienced supra-
national communities are characterised by fluidity, complexity and dynamism. That this is 
true is highlighted when we consider supra-national political communities as involving a 
complex web of formal agreements and treaties alongside organisations and processes 
operating in the broad field of ‘global civil society’. Such processes do not necessarily result 
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from top-down governance. As the American political scientist Benjamin Barber (2005: 102) 
points out, ‘a social foundation of civic institutions and citizenship facilitates the emergence 
of sovereign governance ...citizens need not await presidents or governments to embrace 
interdependence and work to construct a civic architecture of global co-operation’. Crucially, 
just as supranational political communities are fluid, dynamic, and currently being shaped 
and co-determined by the actual practices of citizenship, so too are the obligations which 
exist within them. Rather than understanding obligation as given and predetermined, as 
strong cosmopolitans do, a virtue-based perspective presents the obligations of cosmopolitan 
citizenship as at least in part determined by actors and activities undertaken within globalised 
political communities. Moreover, there is reason to believe that citizen engagement at a 
global level is likely to increase participation within the nation-state. It is hard to imagine too 
many examples of citizen engagement in global affairs (either in relation to governance or 
what might broadly be termed global civil society) which can occur without recourse or 
connection to local and national institutions, systems or organisations. In this sense, there is 
scope for accepting the viewpoint that the practice of citizenship in supra-national contexts 
enables the citizen to form and express certain attitudes, dispositions and capacities – or 
virtues – and that this mutually reinforces the practice of citizenship at national and sub-
national levels. Furthermore, one need not be able to delineate and detail every possible 
avenue for supra-national involvement in order to accept this basic proposition.  
 
This does, however, lead to a third immediate tension inherent in the suggestion that a virtue-
based approach to the moral nature of cosmopolitan citizenship is of some value; namely, the 
precise virtues required to engage effectively within cosmopolitan political communities 
(both intra- and supra-national). In responding to this difficulty it is useful to consider, as 
suggested previously, that virtues are virtues per se – applicable to a variety of circumstances 
without a need for any adjectival prefix. The virtues of justice, temperance, prudence, 
courage, compassion and so on appear equally suitable in local, national, and cosmopolitan 
contexts. In addition, and crucially, the substantive types of virtues and meaning thereof will 
benefit from delineation and refinement through the sorts of dialogical processes to which 




These tensions aside, there are significant educational implications of understanding the 
moral requirement of cosmopolitan lives in terms of the virtues necessary for political 
communities rather than in terms of the universalisation of human equity and rights. Before 
considering these however, it is important to recognise that the translation of a conceptual 
awareness of, and commitment to, a virtue-based approach to the moral relationships central 
to cosmopolitanism is unlikely to be unproblematic. As studies have shown, developing 
education for character in schools can be a complex and contested process (see, for example, 
Arthur, 2010). The success is operationalising the sort of conceptual approach to 
cosmopolitanism that I have outlined here will be necessarily affected by the perceptions, 
understandings and confidence of schools and teachers, as well as the relationships which 
schools forge with other social groups influencing the development of young people’s 
character (most notably the family, but also peers, the community, and the media). 
Notwithstanding these tensions, two particular implications for teaching and learning are 
prescient and deserve greater attention in relation to education for cosmopolitan citizenship.  
 
First and foremost, and as the leading virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre (1984: 216) 
highlights, the primary question becomes ‘who am I?’ (and we might add who might I 
become) rather than ‘what should I do?’. In making this comment MacIntyre has in mind, of 
course, small and localised communities. Nevertheless if we accept, as I have sought to 
suggest here, that political communities are possible beyond nation-states, the shift in 
educational focus from a cosmopolitan rule which one should follow to the virtue-based 
development of moral character becomes paramount. As Arthur (2003: 34) explains, ‘[B]eing 
virtuous is not a matter of following a set of prescribed rules, but rather of expressing one’s 
moral character in attitudes, feelings and deeds. Virtuous people are disposed not simply to 
do the right thing, but to become the right sort of person’. From this perspective preparing 
pupils for their cosmopolitan lives, then, becomes a task of developing the requisite character 
dispositions – or virtues – necessary for engagement in diverse local and national 
communities and for participating in political communities at a global level. 
 
Second, it is essential in any educational curricula or process pertaining to globalised 
citizenship that recognition is given to the contested, complex and dynamic nature of global 
political communities. In other words, pupils must be prepared for multifaceted and changing 
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forms of participatory processes and communities. Barber (2005: 103) alludes to the 
developing nature of globalised political communities when he suggests that ‘[F]ashioning a 
global civil society that rests on global civic education and global citizenship will not ensure 
global governance, but it is an indispensible condition for global governance. Citizens, 
whether local or global, are made not born: educated and socialized into their roles rather 
than inhabitants of those roles’. To educate pupils for dynamic global communities will need 
to build upon the sorts of knowledge, skills and dispositions central to participatory and 
dialogical engagement at a local and national level – a movement ‘towards an understanding 
of global politics and cosmopolitan civic education in terms of citizen action, membership 
and sovereignty’ (Peterson, 2011: 432). For teachers, this may be a difficult task, particularly 
given research evidence that suggests that ‘students’ desire to know more about global issues 
is often thwarted by teachers’ lack of knowledge or confidence in these topics’ (Pike, 2008: 
475). Nevertheless, recognition of this is essential if meaningful educational interventions are 




Taken in their most simplistic form, cosmopolitan ideas serve to remind educators of the need 
to educate pupils about, and to engage with: the plural interests which exist in the world, the 
interconnected nature of contemporary political societies, supra-national forms of 
governance, and experiences of oppression and human rights violation in a variety of 
localities. In itself, this claim is relatively unproblematic. Very few would seek to mount a 
cogent and compelling argument that pupils in schools should not be taught about the process 
of globalisation, the greater interconnectedness of nation-states and peoples, and the 
importance of human rights. Most are likely to accept, as I would, that it is appropriate to 
teach pupils the sorts of knowledge, skills and attributes which would enable them to become 
actively involved in globalised politics and political causes if they so choose. It is a further 
step, however, to believe that schools should teach pupils that they are under a moral 
obligation to do so. I have argued here that to take this further step is educationally 
problematic for a number of reasons and that, instead, the moral requirement of cosmopolitan 
education is better conceptualised from a virtue-based perspective rather than a rule-based 
ethic. Such an approach prioritises educational curricula and processes which prepare pupils 
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for cosmopolitan political communities by focusing on the character traits and virtues 
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